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ABSTRACT 
Dellingr, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s (GSFC) first 6U CubeSat, was deployed from the International Space 
Station (ISS) on November 20, 2017. The primary objective of the mission was to apply and appropriately tailor GSFC 
knowledge and capability to design and build a CubeSat that increased resiliency and capability, while containing 
costs. The Dellingr spacecraft is a mixture of COTS and in-house components and includes two science instruments 
– an advanced gated time-of-flight ion-neutral mass spectrometer (INMS) and a boom mounted fluxgate. While a 
traditional GSFC spacecraft approach includes detailed analysis, design, testing, and extensive reviews, the Dellingr 
team adopted a “build, test, fix” approach to identify and correct potential mission ending issues. Yet, despite extensive 
testing, Dellingr immediately experienced unexpected major anomalies once on orbit. Using a flatsat and the insight 
gained from extensive on-orbit engineering data, the team was able to alleviate some of these anomalies and recover 
some of the lost functionality. The extensive set of lessons-learned is driving changes to our systems architecture, 
flight software, and testing approaches, and has provided valuable insight into what is required to produce a NASA 
CubeSat science mission with a moderate assurance of mission success, while containing resource requirements.  
INTRODUCTION 
Dellingr is a 6U CubeSat developed internally at 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The 
objective was to leverage commercial CubeSat 
development and apply and appropriately tailor GSFC 
knowledge and capability to design and build a CubeSat 
that increased resiliency and capability, while 
minimizing mission lifecycle costs. The spacecraft, 
described in a previous paper1, is a mixture of 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) and in-house 
subsystems. This paper focuses on issues that have arisen 
while on-orbit, our approach to identifying and solving 
or working around these issues, and lessons learned from 
those experiences.  
On-orbit events, anomalies, and the team’s responses are 
presented in sequential order, as they occurred during the 
mission, rather than organized by subsystem. We feel 
this provides insight into how our team approached 
determining the source of abnormal behavior and 
recovered from potentially mission-ending anomalies.  
OVERVIEW 
Dellingr was primarily an engineering demonstration 
mission, but also contained two science instruments: a 
boom-mounted fluxgate magnetometer, and a novel 
gated time-of-flight ion-neutral mass spectrometer 
(INMS)1. The INMS is a key instrument for future 
ionospheric Heliophysics missions and validating the 
instrument and characterizing its performance was a key 
post-launch mission objective. Dellingr was designed to 
keep the INMS entrance aperture, located on the +Y 2U 
face, in the ram-pointed direction – i.e. pointed in the 
direction of spacecraft motion – so that ionospheric 
particles could enter the aperture to be measured. This 
orientation required an active attitude-control 
subsystems with several key components in order to 
achieve the desired control. The instrument required 
several weeks of outgassing before we could turn on the 
high-voltage, a delay that impacted our ability to turn on 
the instrument given spacecraft anomalies that appeared 
soon after launch.  
A primary feature of the Failure Detection and 
Correction (FDC) scheme for Dellingr consisted of a 25-
hour reset that power cycled the spacecraft. The 
spacecraft is reset as part of daily operations, so that it 
does not interfere with planned activities. There is also a 
25-hour reset that will power-cycle the spacecraft if the 
daily reset fails to reset the spacecraft or the spacecraft 
exits the daily operations cycle. The 25-hour counter 
restarts every time the spacecraft reboots. This power 
cycle was intended to automatically clear any potential 
issues and single event upsets, while also reducing the 
FDC development effort. While the 25-hour reset 
rescued the satellite on more than 1 occasion, it 
sometimes made troubleshooting and scheduling more 
difficult in other situations.  
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An important aspect of lessons learned from Dellingr 
operations is the difference between making a spacecraft 
mission reliable versus making it resilient. From the 
standpoint of achieving mission success with an 
appropriate and tolerable level of risk and resource 
expenditure, it is potentially more cost-effective to focus 
on resiliency rather than exclusively on reliability. We 
discuss this further at the end of the paper. 
Table 1 provides a summary of significant spacecraft 
events that occurred after Dellingr made it to space. In 
the sections that follow we step through these events. 
DEPLOYMENT AND INITIAL CHECKOUT 
Dellingr was launched to the International Space Station 
on August 14, 2017, via the SpaceX Falcon-9 launch of 
CRS-12. Ejection from the NanoRacks 6U deployer was 
scheduled for the morning (EST) of November 20, 2017. 
The Dellingr team watched a live feed of deployment, 
but as the countdown reached zero on the first attempt 
there was no indication of ejection. The NanoRacks team 
reset the deployer and made a few more attempts to eject 
Dellingr, all of which failed. The ISS then entered 
eclipse, and the NanoRacks team, in conjunction with 
ISS personnel, discovered that connectors on the 
deployers were swapped with an empty slot and the 
release commands were not being received by the 
Dellingr deployer. The ISS operations team proceeded to 
command the correct connector after exiting eclipse, 
with a successful deployment just after noon EST. 
Even with the low resolution live feed it was quickly 
apparent that Dellingr had experienced the first anomaly 
of on-orbit operations, just seconds into the mission: The 
magnetometer boom and UHF antenna deployed 
immediately upon ejection, despite a 30-minute built-in 
delay timer. Figure 1 shows a high-resolution image of 
Dellingr deployment. The magnetometer boom is seen 
clearly pointed to the lower part of the picture, as are the 
UHF antenna. 
 
Figure 1. Photographs of Dellingr’s deployment 
confirmed that both the magnetometer boom and 
the antenna deployed immediately upon ejection 
from the NanoRacks deployer. 
The first downlink pass was at 8:00 PM (EST) at the 
NASA Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) UHF ground 
station. The satellite responded on the first contact 
attempt. Telemetry showed that the satellite had 
automatically entered sun-pointing mode, with the 6U 
face pointed towards the sun, and was maintaining a 
healthy power profile.  
Analysis of the onboard data collected prior to 
deployment is consistent with the satellite having turned 
on while still inside the ISS. Figure 2 shows the battery 
voltage and temperature for the first hours of Dellingr’s 
mission and includes pre- and post-deployment data. The 
system clock booted into a default epoch, as it was 
intended to sync with GPS once deployed, so the initial 
time of the pre-deployment data is unknown. But we can 
infer the most likely scenario for when this initial 
deployment occurred.  
As expected, the spacecraft telemetry at the first turn-on 
of the spacecraft indicated a fully charged battery 
Date Event 
Pre-deployment Spacecraft turned on inside the NanoRacks deployer  
20-Nov-2017 Deployment from ISS 
20-Nov-2017 Contact on first pass 
30-Nov-2017 Anomalous gyro and sun pointing accuracy 
19-Dec-2017 GPS unresponsive 
21-Dec-2017 Determined FSS unusually noisy 
25-Jan-2018 Spacecraft data deleted – unknown cause 
26-Jan – 6-Feb 2018 Unable to talk to flight computer. continuous reset state 
6-Feb-2018 Recovery 
6-Feb-2018 INMS turned on; ion data collected 
14-Feb – 21-Feb-2018 Startup RTS001 V1 uploaded 
22-Feb-2018 INMS filament burn in 
28-Feb-2018 Startup RTS001 V2 uploaded 
26-Mar-2018 Spacecraft data deleted – unknown cause 
29-Mar – 5-Apr-2018 B-dot V1 upload 
12-Apr – 17-Apr-2018 B-dot V2 upload 
1-May – 7-May-2018 B-dot V3 upload (attempt 1) 
8-May – 15-May-2018 B-dot V3 upload 
1-Jun-2018 - present INMS neutral commissioning 
Table 1. Dellingr on-orbit event list 
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system. The battery voltage depleted slowly over the 
course of 17 hours until the safety circuits, triggered off 
the low voltage, shut down the power system. At this 
point, the satellite was still inside the deployer with 
uncharged batteries. The satellite turned on again after 
deployment from the ISS (approximately hour 24 in 
Figure 2), once the batteries had recharged sufficiently 
via power from the solar panels. The time between the 
EPS shutoff due to low battery voltage and the turn-on 
once batteries were recharged is unknown, since the 
internal clock was reset. The 7-hour gap in Figure 2 is 
for illustration purposes only. 
 
 Figure 2. On-orbit battery voltage (top) and 
temperature (bottom) telemetry indicates that 
Dellingr had turned on inside the deployer while 
onboard the ISS. After deployment the spacecraft 
tumbled until the batteries recharged sufficiently to 
turn the spacecraft back on, at which point it 
acquired the sun, and entered stable sun-point 
mode. 
The subsequent telemetry shows that the satellite 
recharged and maintained a healthy battery voltage while 
sun pointing, depleting the batteries slightly during 
periods of eclipse, as expected. The 17-hour profile of 
pre-deployment temperature shows that Dellingr was in 
a stable, controlled temperature environment of 23.6°C 
(74.5°F), very close to the 23.9°C (75°C) temperature of 
the ISS. It is therefore unlikely that deployment occurred 
while the satellite was in the NanoRacks deployer while 
attached to the ISS robot arm, since some type of 
temperature cycling should have been observed. We also 
eliminate ground handling, launch, and ISS storage prior 
to pre-deployment activities, since we cannot develop a 
viable theory that would cause a 17-hour disengagement 
of the safety inhibits while the deployer is under axial 
preload. In addition, a mechanical failure of the 
separation switch is unlikely due to its triple independent 
redundancy. The most likely timeframe is between 
removal of the deployer preload aboard ISS and robot 
arm operations. Our leading theory suggests that the 
clustering of the sensors on a small surface area of the 
spacecraft combined with the NanoRacks deployer 
geometry lead to an inadvertent release of the switches. 
Figure 3 shows the location of the three Dellingr 
separation switches, which are concentrated in a corner 
of the 2U face (bottom left). This side of the satellite 
rested against the deployer door. From delivery to pre-
deployment, a static preload was applied to keep the 
satellite from moving during launch and handling. 
During ISS operations, the preload was removed by an 
astronaut, thereby removing pressure at the door, and 
causing the door to move 0.025”. In principle, the pusher 
plate should have had enough force to depress the 
switches against the door and maintain the inhibit. It is 
believed that interactions between pusher plate, 
clearances on the rails, ganged switches, door 
movement, and friction caused a distribution of pusher 
plate force that was not sufficient to keep switches 
pressed down in the off position. We confirmed that the 
satellite waited 30 minutes after disengagement of the 
switches to deploy the boom and antenna (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 3. Dellingr’s separation switches were located 
at the bottom left corner of a 2U face and depressed 
by pressure against the NanoRacks deployer door. 
Inadvertent power on of the spacecraft while onboard the 
ISS did not pose a risk to the spacecraft or the ISS, due 
to the system design and testing performed before 
launch. The team tested what would happen if the boom 
and antenna release mechanisms failed (or were 
unexpectedly deployed) while inside the canisterized 
dispenser. This test showed no hang-ups and smooth 
ejection, as we were able to verify in real-time watching 
the video feed. By design, all Dellingr transmissions are 
initiated by the ground, and the satellite did not include 
a beacon. In retrospect, if Dellingr had included an 
automatic beacon it would have radiated while inside the 
deployer, with potential unforeseen consequences. 
Power system and battery protection circuits monitored 
the battery levels and kept them from entering a 
dangerously low voltage level. Although unexpected, the 
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system design and on-ground testing mitigated a 
potentially mission-ending anomaly. 
Once deployed (into space), the recorded telemetry (after 
hour 24 in Figure 2) confirmed that once the satellite’s 
batteries had recharged, the satellite automatically 
entered sun-point mode, as designed, with the 6U face 
pointed toward the sun and reaction wheels providing 3-
axis control. Figure 2 shows that the satellite recovered 
nicely from the low voltage state, and fully charged the 
batteries after several orbits. 
Evaluation of the satellite state and the deployment 
anomaly was the focus of the first 2 days of operations. 
With the power-positive state of the spacecraft the team 
went into the Thanksgiving holiday break, and 
successfully contacted the spacecraft 5 days later to 
begin spacecraft checkout in earnest. 
SUN POINTING PERFORMANCE 
Dellingr uses a combination of 6 coarse sun sensors (1 
on each face) and 2 fine sun sensors (FSS) on the +Y 6U 
face to obtain knowledge of spacecraft orientation, 3 
reaction wheels to point the spacecraft, and 
magnetotorquers embedded in each solar panel to control 
momentum. Initial checkout of the ACS system 
indicated several issues of concern. 
When in sun-point mode, the FSS provides the angles of 
the spacecraft coordinate system with respect to the sun, 
with 1 towards the sun, 0 perpendicular, and -1 anti-sun. 
While performing checkout of the attitude control 
performance, the team noticed the sun vector was very 
noisy, particularly in the x component. The satellite +Y 
(6U) face should be pointed to the sun during sun 
pointing mode. The high frequency, large amplitude, 
noise observed in Figure 4 would indicate the spacecraft 
was rapidly moving its orientation with respect to the 
sun, but the reaction wheels were incapable of moving 
the spacecraft that quickly over such a large angle. We 
concluded that the spacecraft attitude was not moving as 
rapidly as indicated by the sun vector solution, but that 
the data from the FSS was noisy, for unknown reasons.  
The effects of this noisy sun sensor data were twofold. 
First, the reaction wheel torque commands (Figure 4 
middle panel) shows that the spacecraft was heavily 
torqueing the wheels to respond to what it believed to be 
pointing errors, often to maximum torques and with 
rapid switches in direction. Second, the sensor noise 
made it impossible for the Kalman filter to converge on 
a good attitude solution to achieve eventual ram pointing 
for mass spectrometer science. Since this impacted 
INMS science operations, this issue halted the 
progression of the commissioning phase until the team 
could determine the source of the noise. 
Another anomaly observed, shown in the bottom of 
Figure 4, is the occasional increase of reaction wheel 
speed to maximum values during eclipse. The speeding 
up of the wheels, which was later attributed to a software 
bug, by itself was not a major concern, as the small 
CubeSat wheels could not destabilize the spacecraft, and 
after exiting eclipse the spacecraft appeared to reacquire 
sun-point mode fairly quickly. Since it was not related to 
the pointing accuracy issue observed during sun 
pointing, and as it did not seem to adversely affect the 
system, we deferred further investigation of the wheel 
speed-up issue.  
 
Figure 4. The ACS system exhibited noisy sun vector 
solutions (top panel), particularly in the x 
component, which resulted in heavy commanding of 
the reaction wheels (middle panel). Reaction wheel 
speed also exhibited unexpected behavior during 
eclipse. (bottom panel), sometimes accelerating to 
maximum value. 
Dellingr carried two fine sun sensors. The first was an 
in-house developed FSS (WFSS) that had been 
demonstrated through ground testing to have a high level 
of accuracy. The second was a GomSpace fine sun 
sensor (GFSS), as backup, with a lower performance 
accuracy but with flight heritage. The default was to use 
the WFSS, and the satellite included a failure detection 
and correction action that would automatically switch to 
GomSpace sensor data if no or stale data from the in-
house sensor was obtained.  
Nominal spacecraft telemetry includes sun vector from 
the fine sun sensors but it does not indicate which sun 
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sensor was used, in an effort to reduce spacecraft bus 
telemetry size. The team commanded the spacecraft to 
retain individual sun sensor data to investigate sun sensor 
performance. Figure 5 shows simultaneously collected 
Y-axis (6U face, nominally pointed towards the sun) data 
from the in-house and GomSpace sun sensors. The figure 
shows the WFSS produced noisy and erroneous sun 
vector data, while the GomSpace accurately reported 
stable sun-pointing. Stable pointing was also confirmed 
by the energy entering the system from the solar panels. 
Erratic sun pointing such as the one reported by the in-
house sun sensor would show non-constant power 
harvesting, but this was not observed. Despite a noisy 
FSS, stable sun-pointing was achieved since the control 
algorithm was designed such that random noise errors 
canceled. The resulting torque commands on the reaction 
wheels were a major concern, however, because they 
were driving the reaction wheels very hard and changing 
direction.  
 
Figure 5. Dellingr was commanded to send data 
from both sun sensors in an attempt to pinpoint the 
source of noisy sun vector data. Sun-pointing is 
indicated by a value of 1. 
Diagnosing and solving the problem without a second 
sun sensor would have been difficult. The information 
in-hand indicated noisy in-house sun sensor data and the 
failure detection and correction on-board did not switch 
to the secondary sun sensor because noisy data was not 
considered a credible failure mode. The team switched 
off the in-house WFSS, to verify that the FDC would 
switch automatically to the backup GFSS. As expected, 
FDC performed as designed, and the sun vector data 
became very clean once the in-house WFSS was 
switched off, then noisy again immediately when the in-
house WFSS was turned back on (Figure 6). Figure 6 
also shows the reaction wheel torque, demonstrating a 
more stable control while utilizing the GomSpace sun 
sensor. 
While we could manually turn off the noisy WFSS, the 
FDC 25-hour daily reset would automatically revert back 
to using the noisy WFSS. A permanent fix required a 
software change to prioritize the GomSpace sun sensor 
over the in-house sun sensor. While working on such 
patch other, higher priority, issues appeared and 
temporarily halted the sun sensor patch work. 
 
Figure 6. Dellingr carried two fine sun sensors. 
From ~0.5-3.5 hours, the GomSpace FSS was active 
and indicates accurate sun pointing with Y-axis 
measuring 1 (pointed to sun), X and Z near 0 
(perpendicular to sun) when sunlit. At hour ~3.5, we 
switched to the WFF FSS, and saw an immediate 
increase in the noise level. WFSS sun sensor data 
were the default for the first few months of the 
mission 
THE IMU ISSUE 
Dellingr carries a Sensonor STIM210 Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU) to provide body rotation rates. 
However, it has not been providing accurate data since 
deployment. Recreating and debugging the issue has 
been complicated by the accommodations made to 
integrate the IMU into the spacecraft. The interface to 
the IMU is serial, but all serial interfaces to the flight 
computer were already allocated. We added an I2C to 
Serial converter, which required a TTL-RS422 
converter. This added two additional points of failure for 
the IMU. It also added another device to the I2C bus, 
which already had several devices on it, including the 
reaction wheels. The I2C bus is not ideal, since a failure 
in one I2C bus component risks taking down the entire 
bus and thus all other devices on it, unless I2C isolators 
are utilized. 
The IMU itself was designed to be used at a high data 
rates (up to 2000 Hz), which is significantly faster than 
our ACS cadence of 1 Hz. Reading the IMU at 1 Hz 
using the IMU’s external trigger mode proved to be too 
noisy, so the flight software was modified to read the 
IMU at 10 Hz and provide ACS with a sliding average. 
This further burdened the flight computer and the I2C 
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bus. The fact that the IMU is used for attitude 
determination and control complicates the testing of the 
device. We are using the “42” simulator that allows us to 
simulate attitude and trajectory dynamics for testing of 
the flight ACS software on the flight computer but 
simulate the IMU for these tests. 
These accommodations have complicated debugging the 
IMU issue, as we have no access to the operation of the 
converters in flight. Some raw data from the IMU is 
stored in telemetry, beyond just the sliding average, in 
the form of housekeeping data, but only a fraction of the 
raw messages from the IMU are stored to save downlink 
and radio resources. Unfortunately, the Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) values from the IMU are not 
stored; only a flag that notes if the CRC check passed. It 
would be preferable to have the CRC with the rest of the 
raw data to confirm on the ground that the data from the 
IMU is not being corrupted by the converters. 
Our investigation into the issue has thus far been 
inconclusive. The data as read on the flight computer 
appears to be valid from the IMU, as the CRC check is 
passing. However, the data itself appears incorrect. The 
data repeats the same values over hundreds of 
consecutive readings, a behavior that we did not observe 
during testing.  
We have attempted to recreate the issue on the ground 
through use of a flatsat (Figure 7). The flatsat has been 
assembled from engineering units and spare parts. It is 
based around a custom backplane for PC-104 connectors 
which allows components to be added and removed with 
ease. One thing we are lacking is a spare Cadet radio. 
Instead, we are using a Cadet simulator program 
developed by NASA's Independent Verification and 
Validation (IV&V) Facility. This allows us to complete 
the loop between the flight software and ground control 
software to view the telemetry in real-time. Despite 
having a spare IMU and a reasonable approximation of 
the other hardware on board, we have not been able to 
recreate the issue using the flatsat.  
If we are not able to recreate the issue on the ground, we 
have the option to upload new applications to the 
spacecraft. For information gathering purposes it would 
be preferable to already have some diagnostic 
functionality built in, rather than rely on a software patch 
upload. For example, being able to send commands from 
the ground and receive data back from the IMU would 
be beneficial. Unfortunately, most of our byte-level 
interactions with the hardware are contained in a 
hardware library that is not accessible by our software 
applications. 
The fact that the IMU shares the I2C bus with other 
devices introduces more uncertainties. The reaction 
wheels have experienced issues on the I2C bus during 
flight, which may cause the IMU problem, be a symptom 
of it, or due to interactions with another device on the 
bus. Unfortunately, the original flight software did not 
provide a flexible interface to isolate the power on the 
devices, as power state was tied to the spacecraft's mode 
of operation. This was altered later in the mission. 
LOSS OF GPS 
Dellingr carried a Novatel GPS (OEMV-1G) that failed 
on December 16, 2017, less than 1 month into the 
mission. The GPS telemetry shown in Figure 8 appears 
to show the moment the GPS failed. For the first 2 hours 
of the interval, the GPS reliably calculated the location 
of the spacecraft (top panel). During this time, it 
alternated between pulling ~327 mA and 440 mA; the 
majority of the telemetry was at 327 mA. Near 2:15, The 
telemetry showed a sudden change in the current draw, 
down to 280 mA, and a slight drop in temperature, 
suggesting a component failure on the GPS card. The 
next set of telemetry, just before hour 5, showed no 
current draw and zeros for the GPS-derived location. 
The loss of the GPS was a major blow to the mission, as 
it eliminated the real-time ephemeris that was necessary 
for flying the spacecraft in a 3-axis, ram-pointed 
orientation. The best orientation for INMS science 
would have been to establish a fixed attitude relative to 
the local-vertical, local-horizontal (LVLH) frame with 
the INMS entrance aperture in the ram direction, and the 
Y-axis of the spacecraft (6U face) in a direction to 
optimize power production over the orbit (dependent on 
beta angle). Establishing an LVLH frame with no 
onboard capability to directly sense the Earth or the 
direction of nadir requires two computations. First, the 
FSW was designed to calculate the LVLH frame relative 
to inertial space using output from the GPS receiver. This 
would provide a target quaternion in the inertial frame. 
 
Figure 7. Dellingr flatsat 
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The second computation is to determine the inertial 
attitude well enough to align the body with the LVLH 
target. A computationally efficient extended Kalman 
filter (EKF) was designed for the mission. Because the 
rotational rates in an LVLH-fixed frame are very low, an 
IMU with good rate resolution at low rates was needed 
for the attitude propagation step of the EKF. To make 
corrections to the attitude estimate, the EKF would 
compare the sun sensor measurements to the expected 
values from the onboard solar ephemeris, and the 
magnetometer measurements would be compared with 
an onboard magnetic field model. This magnetic field 
model was driven by the GPS location measurements. 
All four of these information sources – GPS, 
magnetometer, FSS, and onboard sun ephemerid plus the 
magnetic field model – were necessary for Dellingr to fly 
in an LVLH-fixed attitude. The loss of GPS meant that 
the spacecraft could not maintain an LVLH attitude. An 
onboard ephemeris calculation was not possible because 
it would have been too computationally intensive for the 
flight computer. 
 
Figure 8. Interval when the GPS failed.  
THE RESET PROBLEM 
In the middle of January, the spacecraft started to show 
resets outside the expected daily reset. At first, the data 
showed a potentially thermal-related issue that caused 
multiple system resets a few minutes after entering 
eclipse, and then again a few minutes after exiting 
eclipse (Figure 9). Resets are indicated by an increase in 
the reset counter (top panel). The frequency of the resets 
rapidly increased to the point that by January 27th the 
spacecraft had entered a state of constant resets, once 
every 63 seconds, rendering ground communication with 
the flight computer impossible. 
Figure 9. Data from January 26, 2018, showing an 
example of resets and I2C errors seemingly 
associated with entering and exiting eclipse. Resets 
are indicated by increases by the reset counter. 
In normal operation the flight computer sends data to the 
radio for later download. Furthermore, the radio is 
connected directly to the voltage busses without 
switches. Since we could not communicate through the 
flight computer, on January 31st the team sent commands 
directly to the radio to download data, to test if the reset 
was localized to the on-board computer or if the power 
system was resetting the entire satellite. During these 
ground passes, we were able to communicate to the radio 
without interruption, thus isolating the reset issue to the 
on-board computer, rather than the EPS. If the EPS had 
been triggering the resets, the spacecraft would have 
rebooted during the typically 5-7 minute duration of the 
passes. As the system booted up we noted that the FSW 
was sending limited telemetry to the radio – telemetry 
that included the boot-up logs. Review of this telemetry 
indicated that the flight computer crashed at the same 
point of the boot cycle, 63 seconds in, when it attempted 
to communicate with the I2C devices. We were able to 
reproduce the crash on the ground with the flatsat and 
isolated the issue to a bug in the I2C driver. The bug is in 
the code that is supposed to prevent simultaneous access 
to the I2C driver by different tasks in the FSW. If two or 
more tasks were trying access the I2C bus at the same 
time, one would gain access to the bus, and the others 
would wait with a 10 second timeout. If the task that had 
access was delayed due to I2C device errors, the waiting 
tasks would eventually timeout and access the bus 
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anyway, causing the crash. Correction of the device 
driver was found to be a simple one-line modification.   
Although we had isolated the problem, we could not alter 
the driver onboard the spacecraft to avoid the crash. It 
was not in an area of the FSW that we could modify 
through ground uploads. The EPS had a 4-minute 
watchdog timer on the I2C line. If it did not see activity 
for 4 minutes it would power cycle the spacecraft. But 
during the 63 second reboot sequence, the flight 
computer utilized the I2C line just enough so that the 
watchdog never tripped. 
From January 27th-February 5th, 2018, the spacecraft 
rebooted continuously, every 63 seconds, reaching over 
13,000 resets over this period. During this time, the 
satellite was inoperable, and it appeared to be an end-of-
mission failure mode. The team had begun to plan a 
check-in schedule, perhaps once/week, to see if the issue 
had resolved itself. 
The Cadet radio has a ground-commanded reset line that 
can be used to reset the on-board computer. By itself, that 
was not helpful, as the flight computer was already 
resetting. However, the team theorized that if during a 
ground pass we could constantly command the radio to 
reset the flight computer so that it never booted far 
enough into the sequence to service the I2C line, the EPS 
watchdog would, after 4 minutes of silence, power cycle 
the spacecraft. It was a longshot to be sure.  
On February 6th during a pass at WFF, the team 
attempted this “back-door” reset but had to wait until the 
next pass to see the results. After the second pass, 
approximately 90 minutes later, the team received an 
email from the ground operator: 
“We just confirm Dellingr back to business” 
It worked. By constantly commanding the radio to reset 
the flight computer we had effectively jammed it and 
triggered an EPS watchdog reset. During the interval of 
constant resets, the team had theorized that the issue was 
high traffic on the I2C line. The current theory revolves 
around degraded components on the I2C line, making the 
line unstable. After recovering the spacecraft, the team 
immediately disabled the reaction wheels to decrease I2C 
traffic, as the reaction wheels are by far the worst 
offender on I2C traffic, with each of the 3 wheels 
communicating on the bus at 10 Hz.  
Later that same day, the team received another email, 
from our project manager: 
“Victory. [We were] able to turn on INMS in the ion 
mode. We had no resets between the last pass and this 
one.” 
By turning off the wheels, we had removed the resets 
completely. But without wheel control the spacecraft 
could no longer maintain a sun pointing orientation. Still, 
we were finally able to turn on the INMS, and a few days 
later, on February 9th, we had spectra (Figure 10). 
Validating the INMS instrument was a key goal of the 
mission, and the team rightly celebrated the recovery. 
But just a few weeks later, Dellingr again found itself in 
a state that threatened to end the mission.  
 
Figure 10. The first ion spectra from Dellingr. 
THE SPIN PROBLEM 
The revised operations plan was to keep the wheels and 
ACS system off during most of the week, and let the 
spacecraft slowly spin about the sun-pointing axis while 
INMS was turned on. At various times in the orbit the 
2U face would spin through the ram, and the INMS 
instrument would collect data. It appeared that the 
reaction wheels could remain operational for a little more 
than 24 hours without inducing the recurrent 63-second 
reset loop. Therefore, at the beginning of the week we 
would turn on the reaction wheels and ACS system to 
ensure the spacecraft remained nominally pointed at the 
sun, and to unload any accumulated momentum.  
Yet it soon became clear that the ACS system was not 
keeping the 6U face pointed towards the sun and, in fact, 
the ACS system seemed to be having no effect on the 
attitude at all. On March 6th, 2018, by fitting a sinusoid 
to the science magnetometer data, we saw the first 
indication that Dellingr was in an uncontrolled, fast-
spinning tumble (Figure 11). The maximum observed 
spin rate was about 105°/sec (17.5 RPM) primarily about 
the body-Y axis (6U face), and all the reaction wheels 
were saturated at maximum speed. The ACS system was 
designed to work at spin rates below about 5.0°/sec/axis, 
so Dellingr was operating well outside the design limits. 
The ACS system appeared unable to unload the spin 
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momentum. The tumbling rate faced some initial 
skepticism because it wasn’t clear to the ACS engineers 
how Dellingr could have reached that high spin rate 
(about 20x Dellingr momentum capacity). Also, 17.5 
RPM is just under the Nyquist frequency where one can 
deterministically assess rate based on the 1 Hz sampling 
rate. Between that and limited and noisy data, it seemed 
serendipitous for Dellingr to be in an uncontrolled yet 
observable state. Nonetheless, the de-tumbling effort 
soon commenced. Determining how the spacecraft 
entered the uncontrolled, rapid spin rate would have to 
wait. 
 
Figure 11. Sine wave fits to the x component of the 
magnetic field data from March 6th provided 
accurate assessment of the spin rate, even with 
unevenly sampled data. 
RECOVERY FROM UNCONTROLLED SPIN 
It was clear from the beginning that options to de-tumble 
Dellingr were limited to magnetic sensing and control. 
The onboard ACS software included a coded but 
untested “B-dot” control algorithm. A B-dot algorithm is 
a reliable, time-proven, simple magnetic detumbling 
algorithm originally proposed in Stickler and Alfriend 
(1976)2.  The B-dot control law is given by 𝑚 = −𝐾?̇? 
where m is the induced dipole, K is a positive gain 
matrix, and ?̇? is the rate of change of the measured 
magnetic field in the body frame (hence “B-dot”). 
However, the default 1 Hz sampling rate of the 
magnetometer and the 0.5 Hz magnetic-control actuation 
cycle introduced a significant amount of time/phase lag 
into the system, making the original onboard B-dot de-
tumble implementation ineffective at the spin rate 
Dellingr was in. The team would have to develop a new 
B-dot software patch and upload it to the spacecraft. 
The first version of the patched B-dot control software 
eliminated the off-pulse cycle of the magnetorquers, 
effectively increasing the actuation cycle to 1 Hz. While 
1 Hz sensing and actuation is still suboptimal, this 
controller was a relatively straightforward 
implementation such that, even if it couldn’t completely 
de-tumble Dellingr, it should restrict the spacecraft to a 
lower rate. At the time, before the root cause for 
tumbling was identified and before sufficient 
characterization was done on the magnetic control loop, 
it was deemed the appropriate action. The first B-dot 
patch was uploaded to the spacecraft over the course of 
a week but was deemed ineffective in affecting the rate 
one way or another. 
The second version of the patched B-dot control software 
took advantage of the parallel processing nature of the 
cFS architecture by placing the B-dot on an 
asynchronous schedule relative to other processes 
thereby giving B-dot the capability to off-pulse the 
magnetorquers and, more importantly, sample the 
magnetometers 250 milliseconds apart, reducing the 
measurement delay necessary for effective B-dot 
control. On a given B-dot control cycle, B-dot first 
turned off all three torquers, waited for some parameter 
defined duration of time, sampled the magnetometers, 
waited for 250 milliseconds (also a commandable 
parameter), sampled the magnetometers a second time, 
and then commanded the torquers for the rest of the 
roughly 1 second actuation cycle period. The second 
version of the patched B-dot software also turned out to 
be ineffective. However, the additional parameterization 
gave us much-improved insights to our magnetometer, 
which became the key to the final, successful 
implementation.  
After the second failed attempt to de-tumble Dellingr, 
the team experimented with several timing parameters 
within the B-dot software and found that the 
magnetometer measurements were sometimes nulled or 
had unexplained biases. It turned out the B-dot algorithm 
was competing with the original magnetometer data 
acquisition and processing application; in a given 1 
second period, the third magnetometer query (outside of 
B-dot), depending on its relative timing with respect to 
B-dot, could corrupt each other’s results (a so called 
“race-condition”). While we were crosschecking the 
precise timing of these various processes against our 
working theory with observed flight data, the team got 
another valuable insight from the magnetometer 
instrument engineer about the serial nature of how 
magnetometer data acquisition is handled. Up until this 
point, the B-dot implementation team had an incorrect 
understanding that upon a magnetometer data query, the 
software will return the latest measurement after about 
150 milliseconds. That turned out to be partially true. 
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The Dellingr magnetometer, upon query, immediately 
returns data collected from the time of the last query and 
collects data for the next query in the following 150 
milliseconds. 
The third and the final B-dot software patch had features 
to avoid race-condition with the science data acquisition 
application while also sampling the magnetometers three 
times within a 1-second period. It utilized the data from 
the last two queries that corresponds to time from the 
first two queries collected within the 1-second period. 
This final implantation is given by 𝑚'()* = 	−𝐾 ∗ -𝑏./01,34(5 − 𝑏./01,67() 
following the timing diagram in Figure 12. 
Dellingr was successfully despun over the weekend of 
May 19-20, 2018. 
 
Figure 12. Timing diagram of the final B-dot 
algorithm. 
The leading theory to explain the root cause that brought 
Dellingr to the high-rate tumbling state appears to be a 
magnetic control software implementation error that 
occurs during eclipse. The Dellingr ACS was designed 
to send zeroed torque commands to the reaction wheel 
during eclipse while momentum unloading of the wheels 
continued. It was discovered during in-flight operations 
that the last reaction wheel command before eclipse 
entry was effectively stuck in the command queue and 
caused the wheel speeds to linearly increase till 
saturation (see Figure 4). At the same time, the magnetic 
control loop continuously attempted to unload the wheel 
momentum for a prolonged period. This continuous 
magnetotorquing spun up the spacecraft to a high spin 
rate.  
Although we do not have data from the interval that spun 
up the spacecraft to the uncontrollable state, we have 
seen the effect throughout the mission. An example is 
shown below in Figure 13. Prior to eclipse the spacecraft 
was spinning about the y-axis, as indicated by the 
magnetic field measurements, with the x and z 
component seeing a quadrature magnetic field. Upon 
entering eclipse near 0.2 hours, reaction wheel Z (2U 
face) accelerated to maximum speed, and the spin 
orientation of the spacecraft changed. The spin period 
(bottom panel) calculated via fits to the magnetic field 
observations tells the story. The z axis spin rate remained 
relatively constant at ~80 seconds, but the x and y axes 
saw an initial decrease to ~35 seconds (i.e., sped up), 
followed by a slow decrease that was due to the 
magnetotorquers attempting to unload wheel 
momentum. By the end of the eclipse, the spacecraft was 
spinning with a 20s spin period about the z axis, then 
recovered quickly once leaving eclipse.  
 
Figure 13. Example of Dellingr body rate changes 
during eclipse. Spin fits of zero indicate a bad fit and 
should be ignored. 
The aforementioned ACS FSW implementation error 
would have been uncovered during the more typical 
Goddard FSW development process. However, such a 
process was not in place for the low-cost Dellingr 
development effort. The limited amount of system-level 
(ACS end-to-end) testing did not uncover the error 
because it did not include the real-life scenario where we 
had a failed GPS and IMU, which together caused the 
poor attitude control performance upon entering eclipse, 
and a rogue magnetic control loop unchecked by an 
IMU. The de-tumbling recovery process also could have 
been smoother had we had a more robust implementation 
of a B-dot controller. The failure to have a working 
robust algorithm combined with limited people 
resources and documentation made the final effort take 
much longer.  
FLIGHT SOFTWARE PATCHES 
During the course of on-orbit operations, several updates 
have been made to the Dellingr flight software including 
command sequence tables to enable more efficient 
passes, a new B-dot control application to de-spin the 
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spacecraft, and a new INMS instrument application to 
maximize the INMS data collection given the current 
state of the spacecraft hardware. The flexibility and 
features provided by the Core Flight System (cFS) 
enabled these updates to be made. 
Dellingr uses NASA/GSFC’s core Flight System flight 
software which is being used on class B missions such as 
the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), the 
Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) mission and the 
Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission. The 
cFS provides the maintenance features that enabled the 
changes that have been made on Dellingr. The cFS 
features that enabled the maintenance included the 
ability to: 
● Upload files to the on-board file system; 
● Verify the size and CRC of a file on the file 
system; 
● Manage on-board files; 
● Individually replace cFS applications; 
● Compress cFS applications to reduce uplink 
bandwidth; 
The first software changes involved updating the on-
board command sequence tables known as Relative 
Time Sequence (RTS) tables. The RTS tables are 
sequences of commands that allow routine on-board 
operations to be automated. The RTS table changes 
included updates to account for malfunctioning 
hardware, and updates to allow more efficient day to day 
operations.  
The first major patch to the Dellingr flight software was 
a replacement cFS application that implemented the B-
dot algorithm in order to de-spin the spacecraft. The 
existing Attitude Control System (ACS) cFS application 
was designed with a built-in B-dot mode, but it was 
determined the mode would not work without changes. 
While the most logical path would have been to fix the 
ACS B-dot code and upload a new version of the ACS 
application, the ACS is the largest loadable application, 
and would have taken many weeks of passes to fully 
upload the new code. Rather than replace the ACS 
application, the team decided to implement the B-dot 
control algorithm in the GPS application, which 
happened to be the smallest flight software to upload. 
The team was able to code the B-dot algorithm, simulate 
its ability to de-spin the spacecraft, and upload it in eight 
parts. The new B-dot application was designed to stop 
the current ACS and reaction wheel applications when 
B-dot is active. The B-dot control application sends 
commands to the cFS Executive Services to stop the 
ACS and Reaction Wheel cFS applications. The B-dot 
control can be commanded to idle mode in case we want 
to run the normal ACS and Reaction Wheel apps.  
After the B-dot patch was able to successfully de-spin 
the spacecraft, the team focused on improving the data 
collection from the INMS instrument. The INMS 
instrument is also controlled by an uploadable cFS 
application, so a new update was designed to improve 
the ability to collect data from the instrument given the 
state of Dellingr. The INMS update consisted of two 
changes, one minor change to allow INMS data 
collection in any spacecraft mode, and one major 
addition to enhance our ability to operate the spacecraft. 
The major addition included a new feature called the 
“Command Sequence Engine” (CSE) that allows a 
sequence of 16-bit sequence commands to be packed into 
a single ground command to the spacecraft. The 
sequence commands include: select telemetry filter 
table, start RTS, turn on Power Supply Electronics (PSE) 
switch, turn off PSE switch, enable INMS data 
collection, disable INMS data collection, delay, enable 
B-DOT mode, and reset the spacecraft. With the addition 
of the CSE, the operators can send a single command to 
operate the spacecraft for up to a day, primarily 
collecting data from the INMS instrument.  
Future flight software updates will include modifications 
to the Reaction Wheel (RW) cFS application, and 
potentially updates to the ACS cFS application to 
account for hardware failures.  
OTHER ON-ORBIT ISSUES 
Operations 
The Dellingr operational plan was to use a traditional 
mission operation center (MOC) located at Goddard in 
Greenbelt, MD and the Wallops UHF Ground Station 
(GS) located in Wallops Island, VA.  Dellingr, classified 
as a “Do No Harm” mission, operated under a slightly 
higher risk posture than a more traditional Goddard 
mission. Therefore, the team did not perform as much 
extensive MOC testing in regards to contingency 
planning and how operations would be conducted if we 
experienced significant software or hardware problems 
on orbit, compared to missions with a lower risk posture. 
The project plan had assumed a 1-month engineering 
checkout period of the Dellingr satellite followed by 
normal science operations. Normal operations were 
envisioned and designed to support ground contacts 
twice a day Monday through Friday, with most of the 
downloading automated to reduce both staffing and cost. 
The initial checkout after deployment worked mostly as 
planned. Sun-pointing worked and Dellingr was power 
safe which allowed the team to spend time methodically 
going through subsystem checkout. As described above, 
once we began checkout we discovered a number of 
different hardware and software problems. It became 
apparent that the initial checkout was turning into a 
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fulltime engineering exercise in finding solutions and 
workarounds to the issues. The MOC team did not have 
the engineering depth and knowledge specific to 
Dellingr to address these challenges. 
Due to the on-orbit challenges facing the missions, we 
established an Alternate Mission Operation Center 
(AMOC) for the engineering staff to operate, perform 
mission diagnostics, and send corrective software 
patches to restore as much functionality as possible.  This 
approach allowed the engineering team to operate 
directly with the Dellingr system and not be encumbered 
with the MOC operating processes. The engineering 
team operating the AMOC was able to interact directly 
with Dellingr, begin the process to diagnose the issues, 
and work to find solutions to restoring science 
operations.  The MOC staff was used for just standard 
data retrieval and archiving which they were setup to 
perform for the normal mission operations. The recovery 
effort was coordinated by the engineering staff and the 
MOC team was called when the engineering team 
needed their normal support role. This change allowed 
us the streamline recovery efforts and reduce operating 
costs by not needing both teams operating concurrently. 
The AMOC was setup in the Dellingr lab alongside the 
flatsat hardware to support on-orbit diagnostics as 
necessary (Figure 7). From the AMOC we were able to 
interface with the Wallops ground system directly and 
perform ground passes to collect diagnostic data, 
monitor Dellingr health, and upload patches to fix or 
work around anomalies. A tremendous amount of 
engineering knowledge has been gained by the staff in 
how to operate and optimize ground passes based on the 
Cadet radio and the Wallops ground system. For 
example, the team learned to look ahead to ground track 
effects on data quality (primarily whether the pass was 
over land or water), and their impacts to daily operating 
plans, and schedule critical activities accordingly. In 
general, this AMOC continues to be a tremendous 
learning experience for the engineering team and will 
have a major impact on future designs of GSFC’s 
CubeSat missions. 
Data deletion  
Dellingr’s radio memory bank was deleted twice during 
the mission without an identifiable reason. In both cases 
the satellite was neither in the range of the WFF ground 
station nor in the same geographic location. The first 
incident occurred on January 24, 2018, around 10:23 am 
EST, losing approximately 650,000 packets of data. The 
location was estimated to be over the south Atlantic 
Ocean near South Africa and the South Atlantic 
Anomaly (SAA), as shown in Figure 14 (top). The 
second incident occurred on March 24, 2018 at 6:33 pm 
EST, losing around 700,000 packets. This incident 
occurred in the middle of the Europe as shown in Figure 
14 (bottom). 
 
 
Figure 14. Approximate locations of the first (top) 
and second (bottom) data deletion events. 
At this point in time we do not have a good explanation 
for the data deletion events. Direct command of the 
satellite by a UHF ground station seems unlikely since 
knowledge of Cadet radio operations is required since it 
will reject any commands not formatted correctly. While 
a single event upset is possible, particularly since the first 
event occurred near the SAA, we do not have an 
explanation for why an SEU would cause data deletion. 
An SEU does not seem likely for the second deletion 
event. 
Data integrity 
The Cadet radio appears to have an inherent bit-flip 
problem. This behavior was observed during ground 
testing in a laboratory environment but got worse once 
on orbit. The Cadet radio has an error correction protocol 
that can fix the first-bit flip and detect the second one in 
each row of data. However, more than 2 bit-flips per row 
occurs very frequently. We have found empirically that 
data has to be downloaded several times to fill the gaps 
and provide better data coverage. This affects the data 
budget requiring more ground passes to download the 
same data. 
Uploading  
Dellingr has the capability to add, delete or replace 
applications and relative time sequences from the 
ground. This feature is very useful and helped Dellingr 
across the entire operations phase, particularly in 
recovering from potentially mission-ending situations. 
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Uploads are quite challenging, however, due to 
limitations in the Cadet radio’s ability to upload. 
Each radio uplink command size is 101 bytes, but more 
than half are used for headers (PRN, Radio Header, and 
CCSDS header). Such headers make the effective upload 
for each command only 48 bytes. The radio is half 
duplex, meaning that it cannot send and receive data at 
the same time. Also, the radio is in receive mode for 0.1s 
every second, while the rest of the time it is in idle mode. 
Considering each message takes 0.084 seconds 
(101bytes in 9600bps), we need to send each message at 
least ten times to make sure we are hitting the listening 
window of radio. In addition, each command includes a 
delay of around 8 seconds to increase the success rate of 
each command. In general, a command needs to be sent 
several times to be successful. Sending a command 3 
times was typically enough to have a high success rate 
during uplink. In summary, the radio upload speed is 
theoretically 9,600 bps, but in real world operations, we 
were only able to upload 48 bytes (384 bits) every 24 
seconds, with an effective average upload rate of 16 bps. 
RESILIENCY VS. RELIABILITY.  
Dellingr was envisioned to test the reliability of 
CubeSats, CubeSat subsystems, and CubeSat 
development efforts for NASA science missions, and 
from that perspective, it was a success. We now have a 
wealth of valuable lessons-learned that we are applying 
to future CubeSat missions to increase mission 
reliability, and these lessons span FSW to systems 
engineering to MOC operations. 
Although Dellingr was not a reliable mission, it was, and 
continues to be, resilient. Just on the ACS side alone, 
Dellingr lost GPS and the IMU, had a noisy FSS and a 
bug in the FSW that caused uncontrolled spin-ups, and 
an I2C issue that required turning off the reaction wheels. 
Yet despite these failures and anomalies, we were still 
able obtain to maintain a stable power positive 
orientation through B-dot and obtain INMS ion data. At 
the time of this writing, we are still working to 
commission the neutral side of the INMS instrument, but 
there is every indication that this will occur.  
A typical spacecraft mission has sets of requirements that 
it has to meet to be termed ‘successful’. Dellingr did not 
carry such requirements, but rather had loosely defined 
objectives. A primary objective was to obtain good 
INMS ion and neutral spectra. Given a large expenditure 
of resources, we could probably recover some level of 
ram-pointing through some major software changes. But 
the team instead focused on obtaining INMS data 
through a slow roll of the spacecraft, such that it 
periodically rotates the INMS aperture in the ram 
direction. This would be sufficient to obtain the data 
necessary to validate the instrument. If we had held the 
mission to specific Level 1 requirements, e.g., this would 
not be considered success. But this flexibility in mission 
implementation is required for resource constrained 
CubeSats. In the end, only 3 systems cannot fail: power, 
communication, and C&DH. And we suggest that it is 
critically important for CubeSats to focus limited 
resources on building an “architecture of resiliency” into 
the design, with a narrowly focused reliability where 
needed. This flexibility, when smartly incorporated into 
the mission design, greatly increases the odds of mission 
success, even if that path to success was not the one 
initially envisioned. 
KEY LESSONS LEARNED 
Dellingr on-orbit operations provided a wealth of 
lessons-learned. We list these below, in no particular 
order: 
• A daily reset is a good failure detection and 
correction solution if the concept of operations 
allows. This minimizes the development of 
algorithms and code to detect and react to certain 
events in addition to overhead for the on-board 
computer to monitor such telemetry points. 
• Patching software is a common theme over the 
course of the Dellingr mission operations. The 
ability to replace almost any code driving 
operations is a vital capability that can potentially 
save missions.  
• Uploading is challenging due to limited capability. 
A conscious effort needs to happen during the 
development of the software to minimize uploads. 
Examples include table-based parameters and the 
ability to change parts of a table instead of having 
to upload a new table when changing one of such 
parameters, and small application sizes 
• Adding as much telemetry as possible and creating 
filter tables is a good way to improve the ability to 
troubleshoot. During nominal operations of 
Dellingr, the amount of bus telemetry points 
recorded and their cadence can be lowered to 
minimize downloads. In case of anomalies or 
during commissioning, the filter table can be set to 
acquire selected telemetry and at a faster rate as 
needed. 
• Consider using redundant systems when having 
reliability concerns if budget allows. Sometimes it 
is less expensive to fly a redundant system than 
attempting to improve the reliability or a single 
component. Dellingr flew fine sun sensors from 
two separate providers. 
• With the increased risk posture of CubeSats, one 
should plan in more contingency schedule time and 
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engineering staff for checkout and corrective 
actions on-orbit than a traditional mission. 
• Plan to invest more time into data reduction, 
analysis and trending to help identify subtle 
hardware problems and take corrective action 
before it turns into a larger problem. 
• Don’t design your FDC for only handling failed 
components but also misbehaving hardware that 
works intermittently. 
• Add hardware diagnostics to your software to help 
isolate problems. 
• Add more flexibility to your software in its ability 
to reconfigure between different ACS control 
modes and science instrument usage to gain more 
resiliency in your overall system to perform its 
mission. 
• Having a full flatsat available is preferable, as is 
extensive flight software testing with hardware in 
the loop and a physics simulator. When selecting 
hardware components, generally the fewer devices 
that share a communication bus the better.  
• Sensor and actuator hardware should match the 
flight computer's processing power; overshooting 
specifications can cause as many problems as 
under shooting. 
• Relatively low-cost lessons for flight software are 
to ensure that low level hardware interfaces are 
available to ground control software. This will 
likely be advantageous for development and 
testing. Dellingr used a separate diagnostic mode 
to develop low level drivers and perform tests, 
which accelerated development early on but is now 
useless for diagnosing issues in flight. Using a 
flight software framework that allows for software 
to be updated in flight, such as NASA's open 
source core Flight System, is essential for enabling 
fixes after launch. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite multiple hardware anomalies and failures 
Dellingr continues to operate at the time of this 
writing. We are commissioning the INMS neutral mode, 
which involves activation of an ionization filament. The 
key to Dellingr’s continued operation is that the most 
critical subsystems – communication, power and C&DH 
– still function. With a limited budget and tight schedule, 
we made the strategic decision to focus most of the 
extensive ground testing on ensuring the reliability of 
those three subsystems, and it has paid off for the 
mission. The ACS system was the last one to be fully 
integrated and tested; it was also the most difficult and 
costly subsystem to perform end-to-end tests on to 
uncover hardware or software issues. The team strategy 
for reducing ACS risk and controlling test cost was to 
focus on sun-pointing mode reliability. If Dellingr could 
sun-point and stay power positive, then we could use our 
ability to upload software patches to correct pointing or 
other issues in the control system software. However, we 
had not expected that so many hardware issues would 
affect Dellingr. Still, this on-orbit flexibility was the 
lifesaving feature that allowed us to continue operations 
and work around these discrete ACS component issues 
as well. The bottom line is that this “architecture of 
resiliency” is always a good thing to build into your 
CubeSat mission, and the low costs of subsystem 
components such as sun sensors makes it easy to add in 
extra hardware. 
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